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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Randy Darn is Washington's Superintendent of Public Instruction,
a nonpartisan elected state officer whose constitutional duty is to "have
supervision over all matters pertaining to public schools." Canst. art. III,
§ 22. As the State's chief school officer, the Superintendent plays a unique

role. He is the sole statewide elected official col).stitutionally tesponsible for
supervising public education, and he heads up Washington's state educ'J,tion
agency, the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction ("OSPI").

By letter dated March 2, 2016, Deputy Conunissioner Wal te.r Burton
informed the Supelintendent that the Chief Justice granted his motion to file

this brief.
ISSUES

1.

This Court held the State in contempt for failure to comply

with the Court's Order dated January 9, 2014. Were the actions of the 2016
Legislature sufficient to purge the contempt?
2.

If the actions of the 2016 Legislature were not sufficient to

purge the contemptt what sanctions or other remedial measures should the
Court order?

.,

'

l.
A.

ARGUMENT

The 2016 Legislatul'e's Action To Address McCleary Did Not
Purge This Court's Ol'der of Contempt

The first issue is whether the 2016 Legislature's actions to address
McCleary were sufficient to purge the order of contempt entered against the

State of Washington and vacate the one hul)dred thousand dollar ($1 OOlOOO)

per day remedial penalty imposed by the Court. The answer is no.
The State points to the Legislature's accomplislunents in the. areas

of stu<;lent transportation; materials, supplies, and operating costs, ali-day
kindergarten! and K-3 class size. See State of Washington's Memorandum
Transmitting the Legislature's 2016 Post-Budget Report and Requesting the
Lifting OfContempt and the End Of Sanctions at

17~18

(May 18, 2016).

However, these were the accomplishments of the 2015 Legislature. ·Despite
the progress in 2015, the Legislature did not address significant staffing
needs, compensation needs, excess levy reform, and basic education
funding from a regular and dependable source. See Amicus Br. of Supt. Of
Pub!. Inst. at 4-15 (July 28, 2015) ("2015 Amicus Br."). And this Court

round the actions of the 2015 Legislature insufficient and imposed the
$100,000 a day remedial penalty. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7
at 9 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) ("2015 Order").

2
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The 2016 Legislature made no progress to address the deficiencies
identified by the Court in 2015.

The 2016 Legislatw·e's main

accomplishment was the passage of E2SSB 6195 (Laws of 2016, ch. 3),
which is nothing more than a plan to plan, E2SSB 6195 establishes an
education funding task force. E2SSB 6195 § 2. The purpose of the task
force is to "continue the work of the governor's infonnal working group to
review data and

analysis provided the consultant [and] make

recommendations to the Legislature on implementing the program of basic
education as defined in statute." E2SSB § 2(1).
The problem is that when the Legislature defined basic education in
ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548), it recognized the need to provide

students with "world~class educators[.f ESHB 2261 § 601(1). And so the
Legislature directed the Office of Financial Management ("OFM") to
"convene a technical worldng group to recommend the details of an
enhanced salary allocation[.]"

The Compensation Technical Working

Group Final Report was issued on June 30, 2012. The problem is not a lack
ofinfonnation; it is the lack of political will to use the information. Instead
of solving the problem, the 2016 Legislature kicked the can down the road
and appointed another task force. The Court should not purge the order of
contempt against the state or vacate the remedial penalty.

3
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B.

The Remedial Penalty Is Insufficient To Coe1·ce The Legislature
Into Complying With McCleary

''Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper
case, be employed for either or both of two purposes; to coerce the
defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained." United States v. United Mine Workers
ofAmerica, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04l 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947). When the purpose

of the sanction is to coerce compliance, the Court "must then consider the
character and magnitude of the hann threatened by continued contumacy,
and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about
the result desired.'' Jd. at 304. The remedial penalty imposed on the State
is completely ineffective.
In the usual situation, an individual held in contempt is subject to a
monetary penalty or imprisonment to coerce compliance. This kind of
pressure on an individual is usually effective. The situation is completely
different when the Court holds the State of Washington in contempt. To
comply with this Court's order in McCleary, a majority of the members of
the House and Senate must agree. To coerce compliance, a penalty must
put pressure on individual legislators, and/or motivate the legislators'
constituents to demand that legislators solve the problem.

4
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A remedial penaltyof$100,000 a day sounds like a lot ofmoney.
But the Legislature does not take it seriously. The Court's 2015 Order
imposing the penalty provided if "the legislature hold[s] a special session
and during that session fully compl[ies} with the court's order, the court will
vacate any penalties accruing during the session." 2015 Order at 9. The
Legislature did not hold a special session in 2015 &nd did not make progress
in the 2016 regular session.
The order provides that the "penalty shall be payable daily to be held
in a segregated account for the benefit of basic education." 2015 Order at
9-10. But the Legislature has not bothered to appropliate the funds to pay
the penalty. See 2016 Report to the Washington Supreme Court by the Joint

Select. Committee on Article IX Litigation, 64th Wash. Leg., at 27 . So the
only coercive power of the penalty is that OFM "is computing the
accumulated amount of the sanction on a daily basis and submitting weekly
reports to the Legislature and the State Treasm·er.'' ld.
In E2SSB 6195, the Legislature promises to solve the problem-·
stating its intent that the '~state is fully committed to ftmding its program of
basic education as defined in the statute[.]"

B2SSB 6195 § 1.

In

considering the Courfs power to fashion conditions to purge contempt, the
Court of Appeals observed that a "contemnor's promise of compliance is
the first step. But where that promise is demonstrably unreliable, the court

5
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can insist on more than mere words of promise as a means of pm·ging
contempt. To conclude otherwise would render the statutes unenforceable
and reduce the court to the level ofbeggar." In re MB., 101 Wn. App. 425,
448~

3 P.3d 780 (2000) (emphasis added).

Fully funding basic education is a very complex political and policy
problem that the Legislature must treat with real urgency. The Court cannot
simply rely on the Legislature's promise. The Legislature must act. More
effective sanctions are required for the Legislature to have the political will
to solve the problem.
C.

The Court Should Impose One Or More Of the Following
Sanctions To Coerce Compliance With McCleary
1.

Individual Legislators Could Be Held Ill Contempt And
Subject To A Remedial Penalty

RCW 7.21.030(1) provides in part that the "court may initiate a
proceeding to impose a remedial sanction on its own motion [and] after
notice and hearing, may impose a remedial sanction authorized by this
chapter."

Contempt of court includes "[d]isobedience of any lawful

judgment, decree, order, or process of the court." RCW 7.21.01 O(l)(b).
The statute authorizes a remedial sanction 11 not to exceed two thousand
dollars for each day the contempt of court continues." RCW 7.21.030(2)(b).
A coercive contempt order "must contain a purging clause." State v.

Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985). The Court has

6
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"inherent power ... to hold a person in contempt ... to enforce Ol'dets or
judgments[.]" Id. HBefore the inherent power of the court can be used, the
court must dete1mine that reliance on the statutory basis would be
ii1adequate." Jd.
The contempt order issued by the Court in 2014 was against the
State of

Washington~

not the Legislature or individual legislators. The

Court should consider such a sanction now.

The fact that the defendant in McClecuy v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477,
269 P.3d 227 (20 12), is the State of Washington, not the Legislature, does
not matter. The Court's contempt power is not limited to the named
defendants in a case.
For example, in Delorme v. Int. Bartenders' Union, 18 Wn.2d 444,
446, 139 P.2d 619 (1943), the trial com1 enjoined fue "International
Bartenders; Union Local624 together with all their members, officers and
agents ... from picketing, boycotting, or in any manner interfering with the
plaintiff's place of business[.]" Latet, the plaintiff moved for contempt
sanctions against the Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and
Helpers, Yakima, W;'lshington, Local No. 524, for picketing the business.
The Teamsters argued Hfh.at, because neither they, individually, nor
the union to which they belonged were parties to the original suit, [they]
may not be brought into the case subsequent to the entry of the decree by an

7
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order to show cause[.]" Delorme, 18 Wn;2d at 453. The Court rejected this
argument. The Teamsters "demonstrated that they [were] motivated by a
unity of purpose with the ... bartenders local union, one of the defendants
in the action." Delorme, 48 Wn.2d at 454. The Teamsters were "so tied in
with the acts of the original defendants in the action as to demonstrate that
they have been carried on in cormection with a plan to interfere with the
conduct of respondent's business, to his detriment." Id. "[T]he trial court
properly held that they had intentionally and knowingly violated the decree,
and stood in contempt of court." Id.
Similarly, the Legislature is at the heart of complying with the
Courfs McCleary order. The Court has the authority to find individual
legislators in contempt. If the Court chooses this sanction, it should require
every individual legislator to pay periodic penalties, subject to receiving a
refund if the Legislature purges the contempt order by satisfactorily

addressing McCleary. 1

1 A remedial penalty Imposed against members of the Legislature must be
narrowly designed to compel members to take the necessary actions to ensure that K-12
education is fully funded by 2018. To. that end, the penalty could ·be temporarily stayed
when tnetnbet:S are taking meaningful steps to solve the problem. For example, if the
Legislature goes into a ::;pecial session before the Novembt~t election for the purpo.se of
meeting its constitutional obligations under McClewy, individual remedial sanctions
should not be imposed while the members meet. Alternatively, individual sanctions should
be stayed during any period in which newly elected members participate in work sessions
with key legislators and staff educating them on their McCleary duties. The contempt of
an iudividuallegislator would be purged once he or she left office. State v. Wallace, 96
Wash. 107, 109, 164 P. 741 (1917).

8
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It does little good to have OFM simply total up the amount of such
penalties. 2
2.

Tile Court .Could Enjoin The Payment Of Special Levy
Funds To School Districts

Holding legislators in contempt and imposing a remedial penalty is
a remedy designed to coerce individual legislators directly. The next four
options are designed to coerce legislators, through political pressure from
their voters, to comply with the Courtls order in McCleary.
One option is to enjoin the payment of special levy funds to school
districts.
Special levies are authorized by the voters of the local school

districts. RCW 84.52.053. However; RCW 28A.510.270 provides that the
''county treasurer of each county of this state shall be ex officio treasurer of
the several school districts of their respective counties[.]" "One of the
duties of the county treasurer is to Hreceive and hold all moneys belonging
to such school districts, and to pay them only for legally authorized
obligations of the district." RCW 28A.510.270(1). The county treasurers
collect tax levies, and then allocate and distribute the taxes to the respective
school districts. See RCW 84.56.230.
2

If the Court elects this sanction, it might consider a limited remand to the trial
court so that the penalties could be paid into the registry of the superior court pursuant to
CR 67. Cf. RAP 7.2(c) (the trial court has the authority to enforce judgments); RAP 8.3
(authorizing appe:llate courts to issu~ orders to ensure effective and equitable review).
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If the Legislature does not purge the contempt against the State by a
certain date (e.g.~ January 1, 2017), the Court could enjoin county treasurers
from making those special levy distributions to the local school districts. 3
Such an injunction has a direct nexus to the case~ In McCleary, this
Court stated that: "The trial court concluded that the State has failed to
adequately fund the education required by article IX, section 1." Substantial
evidence supports this conclusion, McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529. The Court
concluded that the

'~he

State has consistently failed to provide adequate

funding for the program of basic educatimt, including funding for essential
operational costs such as utilities and transportation [and that], local
districts have been forced to tmn increasingly to excess levies[.]" Jd,
The State violated article IX, § 1 by failing to fund basic education;
but local school districts also acted impr.operly by using special levies to
pay for basic education. Because districts are using special excess levies to
pay for basic education, and because the use of levies for basic education
violates the constitution, the Court should enjoin the distribution of excess
levy dollars until the Legislature has a plan in place to fully fund K12 education with state dollars. Such an order would cause school distdcts

The injunction would only prohibit the treasurer from distributiJ~g the levy
proceeds. It would not prohibit school districts from putting a special levy on the ballot or
counties from collecting the levy. That way, ifthe contempt is purged, school districts will
have access to their special levy taxes.
3
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and the public to immediately demand legislators to provide adequate state
funding.
The Court has

the

authority to issue an injunction to county

treasurers. Under RCW 7.21.030(2)(d), the Coutt may impose "[a]ny other
remedial sanction other than the sanctions specified in (a) through (c) ofthis
subsection if the CoUit expressly finds that those sanctions would be
ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court." fu addition, "the
courts retain all the equitable powers inherent in them, and may still exercise
them when the occasion demands it." O'Brien v. Johnson, 32 Wn.2d 404,
407, 202 P.2d 248 (1949) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). As
with contempt, the Court's injunctive power is not limited to parties. 1"To
render a person amenable to an injunction it is not necessary that they should
have been a party to the suit, so long as they had actual notice of the contents
of such injunction." State v. Wallace, 114 Wash. 692, 693-4, 195 P. 1049
(1921) (citation and intemal punctuation omitted).
3.

The Court Could Enjoin The Operation Of Certain State
Tax Credits And Exemptions

Another option to put pressure on the Legislature is to enjoin the
operation of certain state tax exemptionsj

credits~

and preferential tax rates.

McCleary was decided in January 2012. During the legislative sessions in
2013, 2014, and 2015, the Legislature enacted 39 tax exemptions, credits,

11
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and preferential rates.

2016 Tax Exemption Study, Introduction and

Summary of Findings, Table 5> at 1"8. 4 Enjoining tax exemptions, credits,
and preferential rates will put a different kind of pressure on the Legislature
than cutting off special levy funds; and the pressure would likely come from
both large and small taxpayers.
For example, in 2013 the Legislature enacted ESSB 5952 (Laws of
2013, 3rd Spec. Sess. ch. 2). This law purported to "[i]ncentiviz[e] a long-

tenn commitment to maintain and grow jobs in the aerospace industry in
Washington state by extending- the expiration date of aerospace tax

preferences and expanding the sales and use tax exemptions for the
construction of new facilities used to manufacture superefficient
airplanes[.]" Final Bill Report on ESSB 5952 at 1, 63rd Spec, Sess. (2013).
Among other things, ESSE 5952 reduced the business and
occupation tax. ("B&O") for the manufacture of commercial airplanes from
0.484 percent to 0.2904 percent> and it reduced the service and other
activities B&O tax. for taxpayers with qualified aerospace product
development for other entities from 1.5 percent to 0.9 percent.

See

Department of Revenue Fiscal Note to S.B. 5952 at 2 (Nov. 7, 2013).

4
See
http://dor. wa. gov/content/aboutus/statisticsandreports/20 16/
Tax:_Exemptions_2016/Default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2016).
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The Department of Revenue estimated that the impact of SB 5952
would be greater than $50,000 per fiscal year in that biennium. Jd. at 1, It

was no doubt·substantially higher than that.
Sometimes the Legislature enacts a single law that contains a
number of srnall exemptions or credits.

For example, in 2013, the

Legislature passed ESSB 5882 (Laws of 2013, 2nd Spec. Sess. ch. 13),

which set a number ofB&O tax and sales and use tax exemptions. Among
many other things~ the law exempted from the state sales tax «clay targets
purchased by a nonprofit gun club for use in providing the activity of clay
target shooting for a fee." ESSB 5882 § 402. The clay targets were also
exempted from the state use tax. ld. at§ 403. While the fiscal impact of the
clay target exemption may have been small, the aggregate impact ofESSB
5882's individual exemptions has surely been significant.
If the Court chooses this option, it is important to know which tax
exemptions, credits, and preferential rates to enjoin. The injunction should
have some nexus to the case. Prior to the Court's McCleary decision in
January 2012l the case was on appeal and it was not certain that this Court
would conclude the State was violating article IX, § 1. However, after the
Court issued its July 18, 2012, order maintaining continuing jurisdiction,
the Legislature was on notice that complying with McClemy took priority
over new tax exemptions, credits, and preferential rates. TI1e Legislature

13

nevertheless enacted new tax breaks. See 2013 Final Legislative Report at
July 23, 2013), 2014 Final Legislative Report at

193~196

(Wash. Apr. 22, 2014), and 2015 Final Legislative Report at

311~317

298·303

(W~sh.

(Wash. Sept. 28, 2015).

TI1e Court can enjoin the operation of B&O and state sales and use
tax exemptions, credits, and preferential rates enacted after 2013, and order
the Department of Revenue to disallow any of the enjoined t::tx breaks that
appear on tax returns filed with the Department. 5
The order should also require the Deprntment to identify all B&O
and state sales and use tax exemptions, and prefet~ential rates enacted after
2013. The Court has the authority to issue "mandatory injunctions [fuat]
compel[] the performance of some affirmative act." 15 Karl B. Tegland,

Washinh»!On Practice: Civl.l Procedure § 44:3, at 236 (2"d ed. 2009). Of
course, if the injunction succeeds in getting large and small taxpayers to put
pressure on the Legislature to comply with McCleary, it would be dissolved

5 If the

Court chooses this option it should focus on the B&O and stale sales and
use tax·. Those two taxes, along with tho state property tax, form the largest dollar
amount of exemptions. See 2016 Tax Exemption Study, Introduction and Summmy of
Findings, Chart 1, at 1-3;
http://dor.wa.gov/docsJreports/2016/Tax_Exernption_Study_2016/0l_Intro_and_Summar
y_of..f'indings.pdf. Since the property tax is collected by county treasurer, not the
Department, of Revenue, it would be m~tch more difficult to enjoin property tax
exemptions.
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.

and taxpayers could then file amended tax returns to take advantage of the
exemptions and credits provided under statute.
4.

The Court Could Enjoin The Expenditure Of NonEducation State Funds That Are Not Constitutionally
Required Or Otherwise Necessary

The Superintendent's prior amicus curiae briefs urged the Court to
enjoin state spending of non-education state funds that are not
constitutionally required or necessary to preserve the health and safety of
the citizens of Washington. See Amicus Br. of Supt. Of Publ. Inst. at 11-12
(Aug., 4 2014) ("2014 Amicus Br/'); 2015 Amicus Br. at 19·20.
The question is how to identify the spending to be enjoined. In 2015,
OFM issued a dire.ctive requiring agencies to conduct contingency planning
for a partial shutdown of state government in case the Legislature failed to
adopt an operating budget. Agencies were directed to divide their spending
into categories. Two of the categories were: services that must be continued
based on certain constitutional mandates and federal law, with the caveat
that agencies will consult their assigtted Assistant Attorney General for
clarification; and services necessary for the immediate response to issues of
public safety, or to avoid catastrophic loss of state property. Based on the
contingency plans already developed, an injunction could be issued
enjoining spending that does not fall into these two categories.

15

This could be done by issuing an injunction directed to the
Governor. Under RCW 43.88.110(7), if "the governor projects a cash
deficit in a particular fund or account as defined by RCW 43.88.050, the
governor shall make across-the-board reductions in allotments for that
particular fund or account so as to prevent a cash deficit[.]" Of course,
RCW 43.88.050(7) would not apply directly to a writ issued by the Court.
But it does identify the Governor as the appropriate official to enforce the
Court's injunction.
Cutting off special levy funds would bring pressure fi.-om parents and
local school districts. Enjoining tax credits and exemptions would bring
pressure from large and small ta:x,payers. Shutting down the State, except
for essential service 7 would seem to bring the most pressure to coerce the
Legislature to comply with McCleary.
5.

The Court Could Enjoin The Operation Of The Public
Schools

One option that the respondents have argued for is shutting down
the public schools. Plaintiff/Respondents' 2013 Post-Budget Filing at 4647, n. 1.41 (Sept. 30, 2013). The most relevant case· appears to be Robinson
v. Cahill, 358 70 N.J. 155, 160, A.2d 457 (1976). In Robinson, the New

Jersey Supreme Court issued an order that stated: "On and after July 1,
1976, every public officer, state, county or municipal, is hereby enjoined
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from expending any funds for the support of any free public

school.~'

Robinson; 70 N.J. at 160. The injunction did not apply to some expenditures

such as the "payment of principal, interest and redemption of existing

school bonds, anticipation notes and like obligations.'' I d. The order also
provided that the injunction would not go into effect if''legislative action is
taken providing 'for the funding of the 197 5 Act for the school year 197 6~
1977, effective July 1, 1976; or upon any other legislative action effective
by that date providing for a system of financing the schools in compliance

with the Education Clause of the Constitution/' Robinson, 70 N.J. at 161.

Tlus order was issued on May 13, 1976. On July 91 1976~ the Court
issued another order stating: 1'In view of the enactment oflegislation which

will pennit full funding of the Public School Education Act of 1975, the
injunction issued by this Court on May 13, 1976, ... is dissolved.',

Robinson v. Cahill, 79 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976). Based on these two
orders, it appears that closing the schools did coerce the Legislature in New
Jersey to enact school funding that complied with the state constitution.
The Superintendent has opposed closing the schools as a remedy for
McCleary. See 2014 Amicus Br. at 4, n.l. Closing schools is harmful to

the

students~

and the other remedies suggested in this brief are more

narrowly designed to put effective individual and political pressure on the
Legislature -to addtess McCleary. However, given the apparent success of

17

the remedy in Robinson, closing the schools cannot be ruled out as a
possible final remedy.
If the Court chooses this remedy, it would enjoin the funding of the
public schools. State funding of public schools is a two-step process. Under
RCW 28A.510.250, the Superintendent apportions funds from the state
general fund to the educational service districts, andl under RCW
28A.510.260, the educational service districts apportion those funds to the
school districts. Thus, the Court would issue an injunction prohibiting the
Superintendent fi:om apportioning funds to the educational service districts.
To cut off funding completely, the Court would also enjoin the county
treasurers from paying out special levy proceeds to school districts.

II.

CONCLUSION

The 2016 Legislature failed to address McCleary. The remedial
penalty imposed by the Court is completely ineffective. To motivate the
Legislature to seriously address the problem, the Court must impo.se tougher
sanctions.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June 2016.
WILLIAM B. COLLINS
WSBA#785

Special Assistant Attorney General
3905 Lakehills Drive SE
Olympia, WA 9850 I
360~943" 7534

18

RECEIVED
JUN 0 7 2016
WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT

NO. 84362-7
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MATHEW and STEPHANIE
McCLEARY, ET AL.,

CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE

Respondents,

v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
A ellant.
I hereby certify that I caused the "Superintendent of Public
Instruction's Amicus Brief Addressing 2016 Le.gislature' s Compliance with
McCleary" to be electronically filed with the Supreme Court of the State of
Washine,rton and served a copy of the same on all parties or their counsel of
record on the date below via email transmission as follows:
David Alan Stolier
(Representing Appellant)
Alan D. Copsey
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504~0100
daves(W,atg. wa.gQv
1\WllC@atg. wa.gov

Thomas Fitzgerald Aheame
(Representing Respondents)
Ch1istopher Glenn Emch
Adrian Urquhart Winder
Kelly Ann Lennox
Foster Pepper, P.L.L.C.
1111 3rd Avenue, Suite 3400
Seattle, WA 98101-3299

See also attached Service List

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington
that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this 7th day of June, in Olympia, Washington.

2

Amicus Brief- Service List
Via Email

Katara Jordan
Michael Althauser
Columbia Legal Services
101 Yesler Way, Ste. 300
Seattle WA 98104

Donald B. Scaramastra
Garvey Schubert Barer
1191 znd Ave., Ste. 1800
Seattle, WA 98101~2939

Michael ._Alth!:luser@columbialegal.org

Katharine George
HarrisonftBenis LLP
2101 Fourth Ave., Ste. 1900
Seattle, WA 98121

Lester Porter, Jr.
Kathleen Haggard
Porter Foster Rorick LLP
601 Union Street, Ste. 800
Seattle, WA 98101

Grant Wiens
Lewis Rice & Fingersh
600 Washington Ave., Ste. 2500
Saint Louis, MO 63101

Stephen K. Eugster
Eugster Law Office PSC
2418 W. l)acific Ave.
Spokane, WA 99201
.eugster@Qugs1erlaw.com

Robert McKenna
David Keenan
OtTick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
701 5111 Ave., Ste 5600
Seattle, WA 98104

Michael Bindas
Institute for Justice- WA
Chapter
10500 NE gth St., Ste 1760
Bellevue, WA 98004
mbindas@ii.org

Hozaifa Y. Cassubhai
Cassubhai Law PLLC
701 51h Ave., Ste. 4200
Seattle, WA 98104

David C. Tarshes
Northwest Justice Project
401 znd Ave. S., Stue. 407
Seattle, WA 98104

}lQ,z.a~fa@cassubhaii~W.:.!~Qm

,,

Paul Lawrence
Matthew J. Segal·
Jamie L. Lisagor
Pacifica Law Group
1191 2nd Ave., Ste. 2000
Seattle, WA 98101

Sarah A. Dwme
US Dep't of Education
915 2nd Ave., Ste3310
Seattle, WA 98174
~arah.dunne@)::ahoo.CQ!Il

l:.au).,JawrettQJ~.@!JacificalaVI!group.com
M.~ttll~Yfl. segal {(l{paci ficala\v:gLQ!JI?,,w9:Q!Il

I{Y!ti.~.lisaw@pacflcala Wg[Q!!l:J.&Pt!l

Nancy 'talner
Attorney at Law
901 5th Ave., Ste. 630
Seattle, WA 98164
talnet!CD.acltl~wa.org

Cynthia Jones
Jones Legal Group LLC
1425 Broadway No. 544
Seattle, WA 98122
9jo:nes@joneslegalgroup.net

OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK
Wednesday, June 08, 2016 8:30AM
'Rani Pettit'
'alanc@atg.wa.gov'; 'daves@atg.wa.gov'; 'ahearne@foster.com';
'Katara.Jordan@columbialegal.org'; 'Michaei.Aithauser@columbialegal.org';
'DScar@gsblaw.com'; 'kgeorge@hbslegal.com'; 'Buzz@pfrwa.com'; 'kathleen@pfrwa.com';
'gwiens@lewisrice.com'; 'eugster@eugsterlaw.com'; 'rmckenna@orrick.com';
'dkeenan@orrick.com'; 'mbindas@ij.org'; 'hozaifa@cassubhailaw.com';
'davidt@nwj ustice. org'; 'Pau l.lawrence@pacificalawg roup. com';
'Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com'; 'Jamie.lisagor@pacficalawgroup.com';
'sarah.dunne@yahoo.com'; 'talner@aclu-wa.org'; 'cjones@joneslegalgroup.net';
'emchc@foster.com'; 'winda@foster.com'; 'lennk@foster.com'
RE: Mathew and Stephanie McCleary, et al. v. State of Washington, No. 84362-7

Received 6/7/2016.
(Disregard last email stating received 6/8/2016)

Supreme Court Clerk's Office
Please note that any pleading filed as an attachment to e-mail will be treated as the original. Therefore, if a filing is byemail attachment, it is not necessary to mail to the court the original of the document.

From: OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2016 8:14AM
To: 'Rani Pettit' <Roni.Pettlt@i<12.wa.us>
Cc: 'alanc@atg.wa.gov' <alanc@atg.wa.gov>; 'daves@atg.wa.gov' <daves@atg.wa.gov>; 'ahearne@foster.com'
<ahearne@foster.com>; 'Katara.Jordan@columbialegal.org' <Katara.Jordan@columbialegal.org>;
'Michaei.Aithauser@columbialegal.org' <Michaei.Aithauser@columbialegal.org>; 'DScar@gsblaw.com'
<DScar@gsblaw.com>; 'l<george@hbslegal.com' <i<george@hbslegal.com>; 'Buzz@pfrwa.com' <Buzz@pfrwa.com>;
'l<athleen@pfrwa.com' <i<athleen@pfrwa.com>; 'gwiens@lewisrice.com' <gwiens@lewisrice.com>;
'eugster@eugsterlaw.com' <eugster@eugsterlaw.com>; 'rmckenna@orricl<.com' <rmcl<enna@orricl<.com>;
'dl<eenan@orricl<.com' <dl<eenan@orricl<.com>; 'mbindas@lj.org' <mbindas@ij.org>; 'hozaifa@cassubhailaw.com'
<hozaifa@cassubhailaw.com>; 'davidt@nwjustice.org' <davidt@nwjustice.org>; 'Paul.lawrence@pacificalawgroup.com'
<Paul.lawrence@pacificalawgroup.com>; 'Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com'
<Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com>; 'Jamle.lisagor@pacficalawgroup.com' <Jamie.lisagor@pacficalawgroup.com>;
'sarah.dunne@yahoo.com' <sarah.dunne@yahoo.com>; 'talner@aclu-wa.org' <talner@aclu-wa.org>;
'cjones@joneslegalgroup.net' <cjones@joneslegalgroup.net>; 'emchc@foster.com' <emchc@foster.com>;
'winda@foster.com' <winda@foster.com>; 'lenni<@foster.com' <lennl<@foster.com>
Subject: RE: Mathew and Stephanie McCleary, et al. v. State of Washington, No. 84362-7

Received 6/8/2016.

Supreme Court Clerk's Office
Please note that any pleading filed as an attachment to e-mail will be treated as the original. Therefore, if a filing is byemail attachment, it is not necessary to mail to the court the original of the document.

1

From: Roni Pettit [mailto:Roni.Pettit@k12.wa.us)
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2016 4:57PM
To: OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK <SUPREME@COURTS.WA.GOV>
Cc: 'alanc@atg.wa.gov' <alanc@atg.wa.gov>; 'daves@atg.wa.gov' <daves@atg.wa.gov>; 'ahearne@foster.com'
<ahearne@foster.com>; 'Katara.Jordan@columbialegal.org' <Katara.Jordan@columbialegal.org>;
'Michaei.Aithauser@columbialegal.org' <Michaei.Aithauser@columbialegal.org>; 'DScar@gsblaw.com'
<DScar@gsblaw.com>; 'kgeorge@hbslegal.com' <kgeorge@hbslegal.com>; 'Buzz@pfrwa.com' <Buzz@pfrwa.com>;
'kathleen@pfrwa.com' <kathleen@pfrwa.com>; 'gwiens@lewisrice.com' <gwiens@lewisrice.com>;
'eugster@eugsterlaw.com' <eugster@eugsterlaw.com>; 'rmckenna@orrick.com' <rmckenna@orrick.com>;
'dkeenan@orrick.com' <dkeenan@orrick.com>; 'mbindas@ij.org' <mbindas@ij.org>; 'hozaifa@cassubhailaw.com'
<hozaifa@cassubhailaw.com>; 'davidt@nwjustice.org' <davidt@nwjustice.org>; 'Paul.lawrence@pacificalawgroup.com'
<Paul.lawrence@pacificalawgroup.com>; 'Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com'
<Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com>; 'Jamie.lisagor@pacficalawgroup.com' <Jamie.lisagor@pacficalawgroup.com>;
'sarah.dunne@yahoo.com' <sarah.dunne@yahoo.com>; 'talner@aclu-wa.org' <talner@aclu-wa.org>;
'cjones@joneslegalgroup.net' <cjones@ioneslegalgroup.net>; 'emchc@foster.com' <emchc@foster.com>;
'winda@foster.com' <winda@foster.com>; 'lennk@foster.com' <lennk@foster.com>
Subject: Mathew and Stephanie McCleary, et al. v. State of Washington, No. 84362-7
Importance: High

Dear Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington:
RE: Mathew and Stephanie McCleary, et al. v. State of Washington, No. 84362-7
Please find attached the Superintendent of Public Instruction's Amicus Brief Addressing 2016 Legislature's Compliance
with McCleary and Certificate of Service to be filed with the Washington State Supreme Court.
Thank you,
William B. Collins
Special Assistant Attorney General
WSBA #785
{360) 943-7534
wbcollins@comcast.net

2

